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Note 
License to Launch: The Regulatory Future of 
Commercial Ballistic Travel 
Jacob Weindling* 
INTRODUCTION 
On a floating platform in the East China Sea off the coast of 
Shanghai, a tower stands silently in the twilight. A distant boom 
and, moments later, a gout of flame heralds the descent through 
the evening clouds of a large, tapered cone. Standing taller than 
the tower, the now-inert cylinder rocks gently in time with the 
platform on the chop, having rested less than an hour previously 
on a similar platform off the coast of Staten Island in New York. 
Human occupants who boarded this sleek skyscraper halfway 
around the world now disembark and board a ferry to 
immigration, having completed a traditional long-haul 
international journey in one-fifteenth of the time for a direct 
international airplane flight. 
International commercial travel by rocket, a futuristic 
fantasy that has existed in the public mindset for decades, is fast 
becoming seriously plausible thanks to key developments in the 
technology and business arenas. However, ballistic rocket 
technology, in general, and space-launch vehicle technology, 
specifically, are currently regulated by the United States as 
munitions, creating unique regulatory challenges that must be 
addressed before international commercial rocket travel can 
truly take off. 
This note will examine the current state of both national 
and international regulatory schemes of consequence to 
prospective international rocket travel. The background section 
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examines the history of rocket flight and relevant space travel in 
both the governmental and commercial sectors, as well as the 
historical development of the regulatory regime surrounding the 
relevant technologies. This note will then consider the 
consequences of imposing existing rocketry regulations on 
today’s evolving spaceflight industry, and will provide policy 
recommendations and options for modifying those regulations to 
balance legitimate safety concerns with incentives for the 
responsible development of a valuable new means of 
transportation. This note concludes that a new international 
regulatory framework is sorely needed for the sustained 
development of international rocket travel on a commercial 
scale. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In order to fully understand and address the regulatory 
issues facing the emerging industry of commercial rocket-
propelled travel, consideration must be given to the history of 
rocket technology. This background section will do so, with a 
focus on three distinct topics: (1) the history of rocket technology 
and the development of ballistics; (2) the application of rocketry 
to manned spaceflight through programs administered by 
various countries in the 20th century and private entities in the 
21st; and (3) the formulation of international and U.S. 
regulations and standards for rocketry technology. 
A. HISTORY OF ROCKETRY AND BALLISTIC TECHNOLOGY 
A rocket is commonly defined as a jet engine that carries its 
own combustion fuel.1 Rockets burning solid fuel such as 
                                                        
 1. The complete definition of rocket is: “[A] jet engine that . . . consists 
essentially of a combustion chamber and an exhaust nozzle, carries either liquid 
or solid propellants which provide the fuel and oxygen needed for combustion 
and thus make the engine independent of the oxygen of the air, and is used 
especially for the propulsion of a missile (such as a bomb or shell) or a vehicle 
(such as an airplane).” Rocket, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/rocket (last visited Nov. 16, 2018). Distinct from 
ballistic rockets are cruise missiles, which operate more closely in design to 
airplanes. Where ballistic missiles derive the vast majority of their flight power 
from the direct propulsion of a jet engine or engines, cruise missiles derive their 
flight power from “the use of aerodynamic lift over most of [their] flight.” 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, U.S.-USSR, Between the United 
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles art. II , ¶ 
2, Dec. 8, 1987, 27 I.L.M 90. 
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saltpeter or gunpowder have been used for well over a 
millennium.2 Early rockets had applications both as fireworks 
and as weapons.3 It was not until shortly before the advent of 
the 20th century that the first known rocket was developed, 
which produced thrust by combining and igniting liquid 
propellants.4 From 1915 to 1941, Robert Hutchings Goddard 
largely invented the rocket motor and liquid propulsion.5 The 
development of large rockets for the delivery of munitions 
beyond the horizon on a ballistic trajectory followed,6 and on 
October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union (“U.S.S.R.”) used a powerful 
rocket to place the first manmade object in orbit, Sputnik I.7 
Intercontinental ballistic missile designs were rapidly 
repurposed for the development of manned missions to space,8 
and the first human orbited the Earth on April 12, 1961.9 
B. MANNED SPACEFLIGHT OPERATORS 
To date, only the governments of the People’s Republic of 
China (“PRC”), the United States, and the former U.S.S.R. have 
delivered humans to Earth orbit.10 Currently, the PRC and the 
Russian Federation are the two entities with space launch 
vehicles (“SLVs”) currently in service with the proven capability 
                                                        
 2. See WERNER VON BRAUN & FREDERICK I. ORDWAY III, HISTORY OF 
ROCKETRY & SPACE TRAVEL 23 (Thomas Y. Crowell Co.,1966). 
 3. See id at 23–35 (summarizing the evolution of use of explosives in 
countries across the world). 
 4. See id. at 35. 
 5. See id. at 48–52. The Russians were also conducting their own liquid-
propelled rocket development during the early and mid 1930’s. See id. at 62. 
Nazi Germany performed some rocket development as well, and notably 
experimented with a rocket-powered aircraft. See id. at 74. 
 6. See, e.g., id at 86. 
 7. See id. at 158. 
 8. See id. at 163. 
 9. See id. at 205. 
 10. See Jim Yardley, China Sends a Man Into Orbit, Entering the U.S.-
Russian Club, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/15/world/china-sends-a-man-into-orbit-
entering-the-us-russian-club.html. India, while aggressively pursuing its own 
space program, is unlikely to attempt a manned mission within the coming 
decade. Jalees Andrabi & Dean Nelson, India Takes Giant Step to Manned 
Space Mission, THE TELEGRAPH (Dec. 19, 2014), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/11305062/India-takes-
giant-step-to-manned-space-mission.html. 
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of delivering humans to space;11 The United States lost its ability 
to send humans to orbit upon the retirement of the space 
shuttle,12 and the replacement Space Launch System is not 
expected to enter manned service until the 2020s at the 
earliest.13 Furthermore, only one private organization has ever 
delivered a human as far as the edge of space.14 However, the 
landscape is rapidly evolving – today, multiple private 
organizations are racing to provide commercial service to space 
for human passengers. 
Since its inception in 2002, SpaceX has brought two rockets 
to market for commercial space launches.15 While the 
introduction of these rockets was not in and of itself a 
revolutionary innovation,16 in 2015, SpaceX completed the 
development and successful fielding of reusable first stage 
rockets.17 This modified design of the Falcon 9 rocket first stage 
                                                        
 11. See Marina Koren, China’s Growing Ambitions in Space, THE ATLANTIC 
(Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/01/china-
space/497846/. 
 12. See Kenneth Chang, The Shuttle Ends Its Final Voyage and an Era in 
Space, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/22/science/space/22space-shuttle-
atlantis.html. 
 13. See Kenneth Chang, Trump Announces That the Moon is Astronauts’ 
Next Destination, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/11/science/trump-moon-space-
directive.html. 
 14. See John Schwartz, Private Rocket Ship Visits Space Again to Win $10 
Million Prize, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/04/technology/private-rocket-ship-visits-
space-again-to-win-10-million-prize.html. This private spaceship became the 
design inspiration for Virgin Galactic’s SpaceShipTwo currently under 
development. Infra note 29. 
 15. See About SpaceX, SPACEX, http://www.spacex.com/about/capabilities 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2018). SpaceX is a private company founded by Elon Musk 
in 2002 with the goal of providing launch services for private and government 
entities, a goal that has been largely fulfilled. Id. 
 16. See, e.g., Sam Hodgson, How to Cover Rocket Blastoffs With an iPhone, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/22/technology/personaltech/rocket-launches-
space-iphone.html (quoting a commentator who noted that SpaceX’s initial 
innovation was offering pre-existing space launch services at a lower price, 
essentially making it the “Southwest Airlines of rocketry”). 
 17. See Falcon9, SPACEX, https://www.spacex.com/falcon9 (last visited Nov. 
7, 2018); see also Kenneth Chang, SpaceX Rocket Sticks Landing on the 5th Try, 
N.Y. TIMES (April 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/09/science/on-
fifth-try-mission-accomplished-for-spacex-booster-rocket.html (reporting 
SpaceX’s second time successfully landing a booster stage). 
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retains a reserve amount of propellant to fly back to the launch 
pad or a secondary landing site after boosting a payload to the 
edge of space.18 By flying recycled rockets, SpaceX may be able 
to significantly reduce the price of launching rockets into 
space.19 Beyond significantly lowering the cost of spaceflight, 
SpaceX’s next recycled rocket, the Starship, also paves the way 
for a potential sub-orbital point-to-point (“PTP”) commercial 
rocket flight service.20 
SpaceX has completed and successfully tested a heavy-lift 
rocket,21 and is currently developing a habitable capsule for 
carrying human occupants.22 These space launch technologies 
provide the foundation for an intercontinental human 
transportation service with flight durations theoretically below 
an hour between any two locations on Earth.23 In SpaceX’s 
concept, a heavy-lift rocket first stage would boost a second-stage 
passenger rocket to a suborbital trajectory. Upon separation, the 
first stage would fly back to the launch site, while the second 
stage would land at the destination launchpad and be loaded 
onto another first-stage rocket for reuse.24 SpaceX CEO Elon 
                                                        
 18. See Kenneth Chang, Recycled Rockets Could Drop Costs, Speed Space 
Travel, N.Y. TIMES (March 30, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/science/space-x-reuseable-rockets-
launch.html. 
 19. See id. Elon Musk has compared the traditional method of rocketry, in 
which spent rocket stages fall back to earth, and crash into the ocean to sink, 
with the notion of throwing away a 747 after each flight, which would make 
long-distance commercial rocket travel prohibitively expensive. Id. 
 20. See Richard Lawler, Elon Musk Proposes Using SpaceX’s ‘BFR’ to 
Travel Around Earth, ENGADGET (Sept. 29, 2017), 
https://www.engadget.com/2017/09/29/elon-musk-spacex-bfr-travel-earth/. The 
BFR has since been renamed Starship. See Mike Wall, No More BFR: SpaceX 
Changing Name of Mars-Colonizing Rocket, Spaceship, SPACE.COM (Nov. 20, 
2018), https://www.space.com/42499-spacex-bfr-mars-spaceship-name-
change.html. 
 21. Kenneth Chang, Falcon Heavy, in a Roar of Thunder, Carries SpaceX’s 
Ambitions into Orbit, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/06/science/falcon-heavy-spacex-launch.html. 
 22. See Dragon Version 2: SpaceX’s Next Generation Manned Spacecraft, 
SPACEX, (May 30, 2014) http://www.spacex.com/news/2014/05/30/dragon-v2-
spacexs-next-generation-manned-spacecraft. This capsule follows SpaceX’s 
Dragon capsule that has delivered supplies to the International Space Station 
and returned cargo to Earth. Dragon, SPACEX, http://www.spacex.com/dragon 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2018). 
 23. See Lawler, supra note 20. 
 24. SpaceX, Becoming a Multiplanet Species, YOUTUBE (Sept. 29. 2017), 
https://youtu.be/tdUX3ypDVwI. 
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Musk has claimed that this service will eventually be 
competitively priced with conventional long-haul airline 
flights.25 
Two other organizations are also making meaningful strides 
toward human spaceflight. Blue Origin, a spaceflight company 
founded by Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos, is developing both a 
suborbital launch system26 and an orbital launch system.27 The 
former SLV is billed as a means to provide human passengers 
with a flight to space,28 and could also conceivably be utilized for 
international travel. Virgin Galactic, meanwhile, has been 
developing a suborbital spaceplane for commercial flights,29 
based on the design of the first non-governmental vehicle to take 
a human to space.30 While a test flight of Virgin’s SpaceShipTwo 
resulted in the death of a copilot in 2014,31 the company has 
since resumed test flights32 and recently received a $1 billion 
investment from Saudi Arabia.33 
While neither SpaceX, Blue Origin, Virgin Galactic, nor any 
other organization has yet brought commercial SLV travel to 
market for international or orbital destinations, the prospect of 
customers boarding rockets instead of airplanes is clearly taken 
                                                        
 25. See Justin Bachman, How Crazy Is Elon Musk’s Hypersonic Rocket 
Airline? BLOOMBERG (Nov. 17, 2018, 9:32 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-29/how-crazy-is-elon-musk-
s-hypersonic-space-rocket-airline. 
 26. See New Shepard, BLUE ORIGIN, https://www.blueorigin.com/new-
shepard (last visited Nov. 17, 2018). 
 27. See New Glenn, BLUE ORIGIN, https://www.blueorigin.com/new-glenn 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2018). 
 28. See BLUE ORIGIN, supra note 26. 
 29. See Our Vehicles, VIRGIN GALACTIC, 
http://www.virgingalactic.com/human-spaceflight/our-vehicles/ (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2017). 
 30. See Schwartz, supra note 14. 
 31. See Kenneth Chang & John Schwartz, Virgin Galactic’s SpaceShipTwo 
Crashes in New Setback for Commercial Spaceflight, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/01/science/virgin-galactics-spaceshiptwo-
crashes-during-test-flight.html. 
 32. See, e.g., Update From Mojave: VSS Unity Flies With Propulsion 
Systems Installed And Live, VIRGIN GALACTIC, 
https://www.virgingalactic.com/update-from-mojave-vss-unity-flies-with-
propulsion-systems-installed-and-live/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2017.) 
 33. See Andy Pasztor, Saudi Arabia to Inject 1 Billion into Virgin Galactic 
Space Venture, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2017, 7:27 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-to-inject-1-billion-into-virgin-
galactic-space-venture-1509060475. 
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seriously by these well-funded organizations, one of which 
already has developed and delivered to market many rockets 
capable of delivering payloads to orbit.34 
C. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS ON 
BALLISTICS 
Rockets with the ability to reach orbit are generally 
classified as munitions and are subject to U.S. regulations and 
international treaties. The three principal applicable regulatory 
regimes are the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations 
(“ITAR”), the Missile Technology Control Regime (“MTCR”), and 
the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation (“HCOC”). 
ITAR are regulations originally promulgated by the U.S. 
Department of State in 1976 under the authority of the newly-
passed Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”) to “Ensur[e] 
commercial exports of defense articles and defense services are 
consistent with U.S. national security and foreign policy 
objectives.”35 ITAR classifies SLVs as significant military 
equipment.36 ITAR further classifies rockets, SLVs and missiles 
capable of a range of at least 300km as munitions.37 Under ITAR, 
the export of significant military equipment, like SLVs, must 
receive Directorate of Defense Trade Controls38 approval.39 The 
Department of State has continued to make adjustments to the 
ITAR regulations, particularly concerning satellites, with the 
most recent revisions entering into effect in 2017.40 
The MTCR, established in 1987, is an international policy 
agreement originally formed between the United States, the 
United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and 
Japan to restrict sensitive transfers of missiles and related 
                                                        
 34. See SPACEX, supra note 15. 
 35. See 22 U.S.C § 2278 (2014); Directorate of Defense Trade Controls 
Mission, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://pmddtc.state.gov/ (last visited Jan. 31, 
2019). 
 36. Significant Military Equipment, 22 CFR § 120.7 (1997). 
 37. The United States Munitions List, 22 CFR § 121.1 (2018) at Category 
IV (a)(1)–(2). 
 38. Submission of Registration Statement, 22 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2013). 
 39. Exemptions of General Applicability, 22 C.F.R. § 123.16 (2017). 
 40. See New Rules Refine Satellite Export Controls, OFFICE OF SPACE 
COMMERCE (January 10, 2017), http://www.space.commerce.gov/new-rules-
refine-satellite-export-controls/. 
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technology across international lines.41 The MTCR today covers 
35 countries under its umbrella.42 The MTCR was developed to 
restrict the proliferation of physical rocket systems and rocket 
technology, with the goal of depriving other powers of delivery 
systems for weapons of mass destruction.43 The MTCR is not a 
formal treaty, however, and does not impose any formal 
obligations on member states.44 Rather, it is an informal 
agreement that provides a recommended structure for how to 
model national regulations in a uniform way across member 
states.45 Member states are then encouraged to adopt MTCR 
guidelines unilaterally.46 While adoption of specific regulatory 
and statutory schema to enact the policies varies from country 
to country (often on the basis of how developed a rocketry or 
space program, if any, the country possesses), by joining the 
MTCR each member state agrees to an absolute prohibition on 
the export of production facilities for the most restricted rocketry 
systems.47 Like ITAR, the MTCR defines a restricted rocket 
system as any ballistic missile, SLV, or sounding rocket48 
capable of a range of 300km or more.49 
                                                        
 41. Missile Technology Control Regime, 22 C.F.R. § 120.29 (2013). 
 42. See MTCR Partners, MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME, 
http://mtcr.info/partners/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2018). 
 43. “The purpose of these Guidelines is to limit the risks of proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons), by 
controlling transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other 
than manned aircraft) for such weapons. The Guidelines are also intended to 
limit the risk of controlled items and their technology falling into the hands of 
terrorist groups and individuals.” Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-relevant 
Transfers, MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME, http://mtcr.info/guidelines-
for-sensitive-missile-relevant-transfers/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2018). 
 44. See Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Frequently Asked 
Questions, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, (Jan. 20, 2017) 
https://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/2017/266847.htm. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. Sounding rockets are suborbital rockets that deliver a scientific payload 
to the upper atmosphere or outer space to take measurements. The rocket and 
instruments then typically fall back to Earth. See What is a Sounding Rocket? 
NASA (Apr. 12, 2004), 
https://www.nasa.gov/missions/research/f_sounding.html. 
 49. Equipment, Sofware, and Technology Annex, MISSILE TECHNOLOGY 
CONTROL REGIME,19.A.1 (Oct. 19, 2017), http://mtcr.info/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/MTCR-TEM-Technical_Annex_2017-10-19-corr.pdf. 
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The HCoC, formally known as the Hague Code of Conduct 
against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and originally 
spearheaded by MTCR partner states, is a voluntary 
international agreement that seeks to regulate ballistic missiles 
capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction through 
multilateral transparency.50 Subscribers to the HCoC agree to 
make a public announcement before conducting an SLV or 
ballistic missile test-flight or launch.51 While this code is not 
considered a binding treaty, it is notable for having gained 139 
subscriber states, including all of the MTCR states. 
From a United States perspective, these three regulatory 
systems create a tiered schema for international ballistic 
technology regulation. ITAR operates at the national level, the 
MTCR functions among close allies,52 while the HCoC counts 
139 countries as subscribers.53 Notably absent from this 
framework are the PRC and North Korea.54 
II. ANALYSIS 
Part A of the analysis will consider how the existing 
regulatory regime surrounding ballistic technology and SLVs 
provides important controls on technology that would be 
extremely dangerous in the wrong hands, but also creates 
undesirable limitations and uncertainty for the rapidly evolving 
commercial rocket travel industry. How do ITAR, the MTCR and 
the HCoC ensure national and international security? In what 
ways do they fall short? How can they be improved? What 
nonproliferation goals will become impossible to enforce as 
emerging technologies become widely available? Part A will seek 
to address these questions. 
                                                        
 50. What is HCoC? THE HAGUE CODE OF CONDUCT, http://www.hcoc.at/ 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2018). 
 51. Id. 
 52. MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME, supra note 43. 
 53. List of HCoC Subscribing States, THE HAGUE CODE OF CONDUCT, 
http://www.hcoc.at/?tab=subscribing_states&page=subscribing_states (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2018). 
 54. See Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation 
(HCoC), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
https://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/101466.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2017). Also 
notably absent from the HCoC is Brazil, although that country did join the 
MTCR in 1994. See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), MISSILE TECHNOLOGY 
CONTROL REGIME, http://mtcr.info/frequently-asked-questions-faqs/ (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2018). 
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Part B will build on the analysis in Part A to provide policy 
considerations and recommendations for the near-to-medium 
future. This section will examine how the existing regulatory 
schema impact private rocketry entities, as well as how they can 
be improved, overhauled, or supplanted to encourage 
competition and innovation in the rocketry private sector. Part 
B will further examine and identify challenges that are likely to 
arise in any effort to overhaul regulations on an international 
level. 
A.  ITAR, THE MTCR, AND THE HCOC 
Taken together, the ITAR, the MTCR, and the HCoC form a 
regulatory and advisory web that will inform the United States’ 
future decision-making on how to best regulate PTP commercial 
rocket travel. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the effectiveness of these 
existing regulatory systems has been mixed. The absence from 
the HCoC of nations that have developed advanced rocketry 
systems creates a serious regulatory gap.55 The PRC possesses 
its own arsenal of ICBMs and SLVs and is aggressively pursuing 
development of a manned spaceflight program,56 while North 
Korea recently tested a ballistic missile capable of reaching the 
continental United States.57 The MTCR counts fewer members 
among its ranks.58 Its shortcomings are evident whenever 
significant proliferation events include non-member nations, 
such as the sale of DF-3 ballistic missiles by the PRC to Saudi 
Arabia from 1985 to 1988.59 Furthermore, non-participants in 
the MTCR often do not have strong analogous regulatory 
                                                        
 55. See HCoC, supra note 54. 
 56. See Koren, supra note 11. 
 57. See Mark Lander, Choe Sang-Hun, & Helene Cooper, North Korea Fires 
a Ballistic Missile, in a Further Challenge to Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/28/world/asia/north-korea-missile-test.html. 
 58. Specifically, the MTCR counts 35 countries as members. See HCoC, 
supra note 54. 
 59. See Hua Di, China’s Case: Ballistic Missile Proliferation, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL MISSILE BAZAAR: THE NEW SUPPLIERS’ NETWORK 163, 170 
(William C. Potter & Harlan W. Jencks eds., Westview Press, 1994). While the 
author argues that the ballistic missiles had a short life-span due to technical 
design limitations, Saudi Arabia nevertheless was provided with complete 
ballistic missile systems that could be intimately studied by Saudi Arabian 
scientists and engineers. 
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mechanisms for punishing violations of domestic non-
proliferation laws and regulations.60 
The transfer of physical SLV or ballistic missile systems is 
relatively rare between nations that operate SLVs. This is likely 
in large part a consequence of the development of sophisticated 
SLV operations by private corporations, which have been 
increasingly supplanting governments as the primary providers 
of SLVs.61 There is little incentive for a nation to develop its own 
orbital rocketry program when it can spend far less money to 
send satellites and other payloads into space with one of the 
existing SLV providers, and rely on the defense capabilities of 
more powerful allies in the ballistics arena. The greater concern 
lies with the proliferation of critical scientific knowledge of 
ballistic rocketry.62 
In addition to the weaknesses listed above, the MTCR in 
particular also faces competition in the form of Russia’s Global 
Control System for the Nonproliferation of Missiles and Missile 
Technologies (“GCS”).63 The GCS offers access by partner 
countries to space-launch technology, which is a significantly 
more open system than the strict restrictions on the 
international transfer of space-launch technology imposed by 
the MTCR’s guidelines.64 However, the GCS may be born out of 
necessity for Russia, which must regularly transfer rocket 
technology across international borders to its primary orbital 
launch site in Kazakhstan, the Baikonur Cosmodrome.65 
                                                        
 60. See, e.g., Anastasia A. Angelova, Compelling Compliance with 
International Regimes: China and the Missile Technology Control Regime, 38 
COLUM J. TRANSNAT’L L. 419, 441 (1999). 
 61. See Bill Canis, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44708, COMMERCIAL SPACE 
INDUSTRY LAUNCHES A NEW PHASE 1 (2016), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/space/R44708.pdf. 
 62. In the case of North Korea, the ship already may have sailed; the 
country appears to have successfully tested an ICBM capable of payload 
delivery to most of the continental United States. Lander, Sang-Hun, & Cooper, 
Supra note 57. 
 63. See Yuri E. Fedorov, The Global Control System and the International 
Code of Conduct: Competition or Cooperation?, 9 NONPROLIFERATION REV. 30, 
33 (2002). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Andrew E. Kramer, Russian Space Center in Kazakhstan Counts 
Down Its Days of Glory, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/world/asia/kazakh-town-fades-its-days-of-
space-glory-numbered.html. 
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Lastly, the threat of ballistic rocket technology proliferation 
must be taken into account before any recommendations can be 
fully considered.66 For example, despite crushing international 
sanctions, North Korea continues to develop both advanced 
ballistic missile and space-launch vehicle technology.67 For any 
nation considering future development, modern computers are 
more capable of simulating complex systems that previously 
required extensive physical testing and can significantly reduce 
the amount of physical test flights required to establish a 
functioning SLV or ballistic missile system.68 This holds true for 
many of the critical components and materials science testing 
required to complete rocket subsystems, which can be 
thoroughly vetted by sophisticated supercomputer modeling.69 
Consequently, nonproliferation considerations in policy 
negotiations for international SLV travel must reflect the 
realities of the current technological hurdles to ballistic 
technology, rather than the assumed hurdles of the first decades 
of spaceflight. 
B. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 
NEAR- TO MEDIUM-FUTURE 
Moving forward, countries with sophisticated launch 
providers should be prepared to engage in substantial dialogue 
and negotiation of treaties to provide for the transportation of 
SLVs between sovereign territories. Just as a conventional red-
eye flight from Chicago to Hong Kong departs one sovereign 
airspace and lands in another, so too would a 40-minute SLV 
flight between the same destinations pass across international 
borders. 
                                                        
 66. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. MCDANIEL, UNITED STATES TECHNOLOGY 
EXPORT CONTROL : AN ASSESSMENT 109 (Praeger Publishers, 1993). 
 67. See Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea Hints It Is Developing More Advanced 
Ballistic Missiles, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/23/world/asia/north-korea-missiles-kim-
jong-un.html?_r=0; see also David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, After Rocket 
Launching, a Call for New Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/13/world/asia/north-korea-rocket-
launching.html?src=twrhp&_r=0; supra note 57. 
 68. See generally, J.M.A. DANBY, COMPUTER MODELING: FROM SPORTS TO 
SPACEFLIGHT, FROM ORDER TO CHAOS (Willman-Bell 1997). 
 69. Id. 
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As a preliminary matter, the wholesale export of SLVs is not 
likely to present an issue in the near future,70 given the 
propensity for legitimate commercial interests to contract with 
an SLV provider instead of developing their own orbital launch 
solution.71 However, the arrival of foreign SLVs in either 
international waters or sovereign territory will require 
significant regulatory overhaul and international cooperation. 
Consequently, revisions should focus on establishing 
noninterference agreements, rather than focusing on immediate 
concerns regarding the sale of SLV systems to other parties.72 
PTP rocket service will likely operate in a similar way to 
how airlines operate internationally today, with increasingly 
integrated systems to provide uniform information across the 
air-traffic control regime.73 The key difference between the 
existing aviation industry and the prospective PTP service is the 
classification of SLVs as munitions and the danger of the 
proliferation of ballistic technology. The United States likely will 
not want the PRC to exert sovereign control over a SpaceX SLV 
that lands on a platform off the coast of Shanghai, but within 
territorial waters; by the same token, the United States would 
likely be loathe to permit what it considers to be highly sensitive 
munitions to land in international waters in the South China 
Sea. Thus, any agreement between the two countries would 
almost certainly involve strict requirements that an SLV host 
country not interfere with, seek to control, or otherwise examine 
                                                        
 70. Virtually all sophisticated launch providers operate their own SLVs, 
while customers purchase or lease space on the rocket; in virtually no instances 
are SLVs sold by the launch provider to a customer to operate themselves. In 
one of the few technical exceptions, the U.S. provided the U.K. with Trident 
missiles under the Polaris Sales Agreement. Recent Actions Regarding Treaties 
to Which the United States Is a Party, 22 I.L.M. 214, 216 (1983). However, while 
the Trident II is manufactured by Orbital ATK, the sale and transfer to the 
United Kingdom was executed by the U.S. Government. Trident II, NORTHROP 
GRUMMAN, https://www.orbitalatk.com/flight-systems/propulsion-
systems/tridentII/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2018). 
 71. As will be discussed infra, there is a likelihood that portions of some 
SLV systems will likely be exported as a prerequisite for operation. 
 72. This does not preclude the possibility of private SLV developers selling 
SLV systems further down the line, much as airplane manufacturers do today. 
Given the nascence of the industry, it is left to future scholarship to address the 
issue of the prospective international trade in SLV systems. 
 73. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., POINT-TO-POINT COMMERCIAL SPACE 
TRANSPORTATION IN NATIONAL AVIATION SYSTEM, (Mar. 10, 2010), 
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/point_to_
point.pdf. 
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or confiscate any SLV or associated equipment while within the 
host state or international territory. 
There is another wrinkle that must be considered, however. 
In a two-stage PTP service like the one proposed by SpaceX, a 
first-stage booster rocket must be present at both the launch and 
landing site, lest the second stage landing vehicle be stranded or 
otherwise require shipment back to the original launch site. In 
this configuration, the first-stage booster would serve as a local 
resource, propelling second stages toward their destination 
before returning to the originating launchpad for reuse. Under 
this configuration, SpaceX would need to somehow transport a 
first-stage booster to the destination launchpad before 
international flights begin, ironically triggering the ostensibly 
less-relevant restrictions on the physical transfer of rockets 
between sovereign entities.74 
None of this is to say that the venture is necessarily doomed 
by the need for complicated and nuanced international 
diplomacy in the ballistic technology arena; instead, this 
lucrative new mode of transportation should be seen as an 
incentive for nations to engage in the difficult work of 
establishing a new international regulatory regime. Such a 
formulation is not unprecedented. The Chicago Convention, 
originally signed on December 7, 1944, established the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (“ICAO”) and officially 
normalized international air travel on a diplomatic level.75 This 
normalization helped usher in the era of mass air transit, with 
over 42,000 flights per day managed by the Federal Aviation 
Administration alone.76 This convention could serve as a model 
for a future agreement on international commercial rocket travel 
and will be discussed further in Subsection 2. 
Modifications to the existing regulatory environment are 
necessary to permit countries and private industry to proactively 
anticipate PTP rocket travel technology and guide the focus of 
the technological development in this burgeoning industry. As 
discussed below, this Note recommends that at least the 
                                                        
 74. Supra Section II, Part A. 
 75. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Convention on 
International Civil Aviation - Doc 7300, 2006, 
https://www.icao.int/publications/pages/doc7300.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 
2018). 
 76. Air Traffic by the Numbers, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/by_the_numbers/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2018). 
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following xx proposals be considered as a starting point: (1) 
amend the MTCR to grant member states to operate SLVs in 
other member states; (2) expand the HCoC to provide norms for 
international commercial rocket travel; and (3) create a new 
international compact – either independently or as part of the 
HCoC – to develop normative standards for international 
suborbital commercial rocket travel. 
The existing regulatory regime has largely had to adopt to 
new innovations in a reactionary fashion after they have already 
been invented. By providing SLV operators with an 
understanding of what will ultimately be required of them in an 
international commercial rocket travel regulatory regime, 
governments can ensure that they are prepared to benefit from 
this prospective new industry.77 SLV operators can also benefit 
from regulatory clarity, and likely would work to develop PTP 
rocket technology that conforms with relevant international 
standards. 
1. Operational Status of SLV Operators inside Host Nations 
and International Waters78 
a. The MTCR 
As a practical first step, a license to operate SLVs in partner 
states should be incorporated into the MTCR. Partner states will 
                                                        
 77. As an additional consideration, PTP rocket travel will not be possible 
without significant integration of rocket flights into the existing international 
air-traffic control regime. Fortunately, significant upgrades to the National 
Airspace System have resulted in a more streamlined and integrated data 
sharing system for managing the United States’ airspace. FED. AVIATION 
ADMIN., NEXTGEN PRIORITIES JOINT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 2017-2019 
EXECUTIVE REPORT 3 (2016), 
https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/media/NG_Priorities_Joint_Implementation_Pla
n.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2017). The increased need for air-traffic control 
regulation arising out of the proliferation of commercial rocket travel is not 
directly addressed by this note. 
 78. Any regulations or treaties to address this subject will also need to 
address the operational status of such operators in space, as the current 
international agreements regarding the status of space are relatively outdated 
and do little to anticipate the potential for growth. See, e.g., Kirsten Johanson, 
Asteroid Mining – Not as Crazy as It Sounds, MINN. J. of L., SCI., and TECH.: 
LAWSCI FORUM (Dec. 8, 2014), http://editions.lib.umn.edu/mjlst/asteroid-
mining-not-as-crazy-as-it-sounds/. However, this issue falls outside the scope of 
this note, as straightforward PTP rocket flights will be necessarily suborbital, 
with the amount of time spent in space by any SLV measured in minutes, not 
hours. 
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have a strong incentive to sign on to a uniform agreement if and 
when sub-orbital commercial PTP flights become a reality. The 
United States will likely be far more comfortable with a SLV 
operated by an American entity and launched from New York 
landing near London, as opposed to Shanghai. The United States 
and the United Kingdom have pooled critical nuclear technology 
and weapons for the purpose of international nuclear deterrence 
for the past 59 years;79 therefore, it is likely that the State 
Department would be more amicable to the transfer of less 
sensitive ballistics technology across that specific border. Such 
an arrangement could serve as an international demonstration 
of the commercial transportation applications of the technology 
and, if successful, provide a strong impetus for other nations to 
come to the negotiating table. 
b. The HCoC 
An important second step in paving the way to widespread 
international PTP travel is the expansion of the HCoC to 
establish regulatory norms for member states, which would 
effectively require HCoC adoption as a precursor to induction 
into the international rocket travel community. These limits in 
the HCoC should include requirements that a host state for an 
SLV not directly interfere with, study, or confiscate any part of 
an SLV or associated systems. The U.S. State Department would 
do well to adopt a standard for the transfer of SLVs between 
HCoC member states under the revised HCoC limits and 
requirements. 
However, while a general prohibition on foreign SLV 
interference would help to safeguard against the improper 
conversion of ballistic technology, it would not by itself defend 
against all inevitabilities. Imagine, for example, that a fire were 
to erupt on a platform owned and operated by an American SLV 
operator off the coast of Shanghai. Would the PRC be barred 
from providing firefighting services? Would the PRC instead be 
permitted to fight the fire with boats and helicopters, but not to 
land personnel on the platform? Imagine instead that a SLV 
were to crash in a rural province in the Chinese interior. Would 
the PRC be compelled to prioritize noninterference obligations 
under the treaty over the potential loss of human life, 
environmental damage, or national security considerations? The 
                                                        
 79. US–UK Mutual Defence Agreement, U.S.–U.K., July 3, 1958. 
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dilemma posed by these competing obligations can be solved in 
several ways. 
First, the HCoC could provide for limited exceptions to a 
prohibition on interfering with foreign SLVs in emergency 
situations. These exceptions would need to provide a mechanism 
for intimate coordination at the earliest possible time between 
the host and originating nations, and provide that the SLV 
operator must conduct the vast majority of recovery work once 
the risk of loss-of-life or injury had been minimized. On a 
practical level, regimes with mature spaceflight technology80 
will have little incentive to interfere with a foreign SLV 
operator’s equipment for the purpose of discovering the 
technological secrets of advanced ballistics; those challenges 
already have been solved by these nations.81 
Alternatively, the HCoC could instead be expanded to 
establish an international entity that would be in charge of 
managing launch and landing sites, as well as accident and 
malfunction rapid response and recovery. Participating 
countries could be required to fund the supervisory entity’s 
operations within their borders. However, while this would 
ostensibly provide an even playing field for any nation looking to 
open a spaceport, it also would likely face pushback from 
countries that do not easily cede sovereign authority within their 
own borders but nevertheless exercise significant economic and 
political influence. On a theoretical level, treating a spaceport as 
foreign soil may be as simple as treating the spaceport as a 
satellite branch of a local embassy or consulate. In this way, the 
SLV operator’s home nation would have the direct authority to 
conduct recovery operations at the spaceport. However, 
permitting origin country personnel to direct and perform 
recovery operations at a crash site elsewhere in the host country 
could prove to be more than the host country would be willing to 
bear, and some intermediary solution would need to be 
bargained for in treaty deliberations. 
2. The Chicago Convention II 
Adoption of a new convention based on the necessities of 
PTP travel by member states of the HCoC would be an important 
step toward normalizing international attitudes toward PTP 
                                                        
 80. E.g. The PRC, the EU, Japan. 
 81. Id. 
2019] LICENSE TO LAUNCH 279 
 
travel and regulations. This agreement could be either 
formalized as a part of the HCoC framework or independently 
established as the Chicago Convention was in the 20th century.82 
Ultimately, such a ‘second’ Chicago Convention (“Chicago II”) 
could implement technology controls through diplomatic 
exemptions, sovereignty zones, or reciprocity. 
Formulating the convention as an extension of the existing 
HCoC would potentially provide the PRC with significant 
motivation to adopt the Code. Even if the remainder of the code 
remains merely advisory, in practice the effect would be similar 
to a binding agreement: Nations are expected to abide by the 
ICAO’s standards today,83 and those that fail to do so run the 
risk of other countries refusing to receive aircraft originating 
from the noncompliant origin country. As a lucrative business, 
PTP travel will provide a major incentive for the PRC to finally 
join the international community in adopting stricter standards 
for SLVs and ballistic missiles, as other nations would otherwise 
simply freeze the PRC out of PTP travel. Given the PRC’s recent 
major investments in space exploration,84 it is hard to imagine a 
world in which the PRC is not a major player in the international 
rocket travel industry. The U.S. should consequently be 
prepared for the PRC to be present at the negotiating table, and 
to enter the international ballistic regulatory community.85 
Alternatively, a Chicago II could be adopted independent of 
any existing agreement, as was the Chicago Convention.86 This 
route would likely be more attractive to countries not already 
subscribed to the HCoC, as it would provide them with more 
flexibility to negotiate favorable terms. However, it may be more 
difficult to pull subscriber states of the HCoC, and particularly 
MTCR subscribers, to the negotiating table with major players 
like the PRC operating on uneven regulatory ground.87 Unlike 
the Chicago Convention, for which the subject of regulation was 
widely available and well-understood commercial sector 
                                                        
 82. INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, Supra note 75. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Koren, supra note 11. 
 85. Given the PRC’s growing geopolitical clout and ambition, the 
international community should be prepared for significant demands for 
concessions at the negotiating table. Koren, supra note 11. 
 86. INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, supra note 75. 
 87. See generally Di, supra note 59; Angelova, supra note 60. 
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airplane technology,88 any prospective convention for 
normalizing PTP travel regulation would have to contend with 
the reality that the technology at issue is considered a munition 
by most involved parties. Wariness over the PRC’s relatively 
weak regulations, paired with a lack of assurance that the PRC 
will join the international community in adopting uniform 
standards for regulating ballistic technology, could doom the 
initiative. Consequently, while an independent agreement 
should remain in the back pocket of diplomats, an international 
agreement on normalizing PTP travel would be more likely to 
succeed if packaged into an existing treaty. 
Regardless of the theoretical venue for a Chicago II, the 
agreement would need to provide a mechanism to provide 
participating countries with solutions to the existing regulatory 
challenges regarding SLV systems regularly crossing sovereign 
boundaries. The following three options, while not mutually 
exclusive, cover some of the most likely diplomatic issues that 
will need to be addressed for any Chicago II. 
a. Exemptions 
Parties to a Chicago II could agree to carve out exemptions 
in domestic statutory and regulatory arenas to facilitate the 
departure and arrival of foreign SLVs. This deregulatory 
approach would require tacit admission by signatories that the 
ship has sailed on ballistic technology, and would in turn permit 
SLVs to be regulated much as commercial aircraft are regulated 
today. While this approach would likely provide the least 
challenging path forward by effectively deregulating the 
industry, it could also raise grave concerns regarding the 
proliferation of ballistic technology to those states that may seek 
it but do not realistically have the means to develop it 
independently. Whether states ultimately choose to utilize 
exemptions will depend largely on their internal assessments 
regarding the state of international proliferation of ballistic 
technology. 
b. Sovereign Territory 
As one of the major issues facing international SLV travel is 
the control of ballistic technology, one solution could be to ensure 
that the SLV never actually enters another sovereign space. A 
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SpaceX platform floating off the coast of Shanghai, for example, 
would under this arrangement be sovereign U.S. territory. These 
arrangements would provide the strictest guarantee of 
technology security while still allowing the operation of SLVs in 
international contexts, establishing landing sites as pseudo-
embassies or consulates. 
The pitfalls of this approach bear recognition, however. 
Parties to this agreement would need to decide who is 
responsible for managing accidents, providing security, and 
conducting inspections. This approach also would not solve the 
related issue of who would be responsible for conducting 
recovery operations in the event an SLV crashed off-site.89 
c. Reciprocity 
States could ultimately decide to permit SLV travel on a 
system of reciprocity: States would only agree to receive foreign 
SLVs from countries that accept their own SLVs in return. This 
arrangement would, on its face, be least likely to result in 
proliferation of ballistic technology, since it would retain the 
‘members only’ status quo currently more or less enjoyed by the 
current SLV operators. However, this would perhaps drive the 
development of ballistics in countries that otherwise would not 
enter the arena, and consequently would result in many of the 
same proliferation concerns as the exemptions option.90 
Ultimately, it will be up to the states to decide which of these 
approaches strikes the right balance between regulating a new 
industry and protecting sensitive technology. Navigating these 
options will require serious consideration of national security 
imperatives, economic advantages, and international diplomacy 
in a burgeoning field. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Commercial rocket travel looks more promising than ever as 
an emerging industry, with key technological hurdles overcome 
                                                        
 89. This concern has recent parallels in regard to secret technology. One of 
the stealth helicopters used by the U.S. Navy Seals in the raid on Osama bin 
Laden’s compound in Pakistan on May 2, 2011 malfunctioned and was 
destroyed by the Seals prior to departing; the tail section remained largely 
intact however, and was likely viewed by Chinese scientists. Mark Mazzetti, 
U.S. Aides Believe China Examined Stealth Copter, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2011), 
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 90. Supra Part B, Section 2, Subsection a. 
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in recent years. Self-landing rockets have become a pedestrian 
part of SpaceX’s operation, and other companies are eyeing their 
own innovations in the sector with suborbital international SLV 
travel in mind. Governments worldwide must make real efforts 
now to adopt a regulatory regime for international rocket travel, 
or risk being caught by surprise when the technology matures. 
By getting in front of sub-orbital commercial rocket technology, 
governments have the opportunity to shape the development of 
the industry to better fit expected regulatory schema. This in 
turn will encourage SLV operators to pursue the market, 
confident in the support of the international community. By 
tackling this issue head-on, the United States and the 
international community can help to usher in a new era of travel 
on their terms, instead of being taken along for the ride. 
 
